REVIEW, RUSSIA'S MILITARY WAY TO THE WEST

When Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich began the Westernization of his army in 1649 by issuing regulations borrowed from Maurice of Nassau, he could hardly have foreseen that Russian generals after Peter the Great would include Browne, Fermor, Gordon, Keith, Lacy, LeFort, Manstein, Manteuffel, Muennich, Ogilvy and (regrettably) Totleben. Notwithstanding appearances, the 18th century Russian army achieved a distinctive place in the European concert without sacrificing its national identity.
It was the loss of national identity that the conservative aristocracy and Orthodox faithful feared throughout the Petrine era symbolized by the creation of a new capital on the Baltic named Sankt Petir Burk. Peter's collegially administered departments and the Military Code of 1716 continued to influence the armed forces until the early 19th century. Duffy succesfully rehabilitates the reputation of Marshal Muennich as the dominant demiurge of the post-Petrine decades (1725-41). Muennich is credited with scrupulous attention to logistics and pay, broadening the army's educational mission and emphasizing the role of the offence in seeking a "general battle."
The reign of Peter's daughter, Elizabeth (1741-62) was distinguished by the fertile resourcefulness of Peter Shuvalov as Master General of Ordnance and by signal Russian successes over the top-seeded Frederick of Prussia during the Seven Years' War (1765-72). Shuvalov's Wunderwaffen included the unicorn, an all-purpose artillery piece constructed in exact mathematical compromise among the cannon, the howitzer and the mortar. Somewhat less successful was the "secret howitzer," designed to spread a level spray of cannister at a man's height through a bore choked at the muzzle to an oval. It performed adequately, but was slow to reload.
With the surrender of Koenigsberg to William Femor, East Prussia entered a period of Russian occupation during which the St. Petersburg officers fulfilled a mission civilitrice among the rural bears of Brandenburg. The capture of Berlin by General Totleben's corps volant was celebrated until he was exposed as a Prussian mole. Frederick's chief success was attained in dehumanising his victorious rival in propaganda. Elizabeth, however, forbade seeking a general battle as too expensive in lives and East Prussia was returned to Frederick on her death in 1762.
The blitzkreig assaults of Peter III (1762) and Paul (1796-99) on the perceived national identity led to their assassinations by officers of the Guards--exercitus imperator fecit! Duffy's ooutspoken revisionism relative to these two exemplars of regressive Europeanization will be controversial. The best generals of Catherine's reign (1762-96), notably P. Rumiantsev (who adunbrated a theatre concept), M. Kutuzov, G. Potemkin and the nonpareil A. Suvorov restored the traditional emphasis to the offensive. Suvorov, a Russian Patton, was modern in his shrilled emphasis on speed and impact. The consistently poor quality of Tatar ponies and almost undisciplinable Cossack units compelled the best commanders to realise these desiderata through the infantry and artillery.
While for the period specialist, Duffy's history consistently requires political supplement, it is a praiseworthy, courageous and well-grounded narrative with numerous incisive judgments. The style is eminently readable. The publisher is to be congratulated on a remarkably well-dressed volume presented in parade-ground order.

--RUSI, Royal United Services Institutes for Defence Studies, (March, 1983)